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INTRODUCTION 
 
A distinctive feature of the contemporary period of globalization is a powerful 
trend towards marketization in many regions of the world. The term 
„marketization‟ refers both to market ideologies and market-oriented reforms. 
A market ideology reflects the belief that markets are of superior efficiency 
for the allocation of goods and resources. Market-oriented reforms are those 
policies fostering the emergence and development of markets and weakening, 
in parallel, alternative institutional arrangements. 
Since the early 1980s, market ideology and market-oriented policies have 
spread fast and wide around the globe. The global diffusion of marketization 
has had, furthermore, an impact well beyond the traditional boundaries of the 
economy. Marketization implies a redefinition of economic rules of the game 
but also a transformed perspective on states, regulation and their role. 
Marketization is questioning all forms of protective boundaries and barriers 
and having an impact, as a consequence, on social but also on health, cultural 
or legal policies.  
This chapter is not about marketization and its diffusion, though. This has 
been dealt with elsewhere (Djelic, 2006). Rather, what we want to understand 
here is the ideological and moral „ground‟ on which this powerful 
marketization trend rests. We want to explore the moral foundations of 
contemporary marketization with a particular focus on the „ethics of 
competition‟. The exercise will be one in intellectual genealogy. The current 
movement towards global marketization has a lot to do, historically, with the 
development of a particular form of capitalism in the United States and its 
evolution from the late nineteenth century till today (Djelic, 1998; Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Sustaining and reinforcing those structural 
developments, we find in the early period a powerful ideological frame. 
American conservatism towards the end of the nienteenth century was a 
surprising mix of classical economic liberalism, Puritan doctrine and Social 
Darwinism. Through a summary pathway, we trace the intellectual lineage of 
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contemporary marketization by considering the ethics of competition as they 
emerge in turn from Adam Smith and early economic liberalism, the Puritan 
doctrine and Social Darwinism. We end with a focus on the more recent 
neoliberal synthesis, considering in particular the Chicago School. We see 
neoliberalism as both reflecting and embodying some of the ideological 
influences presented below and at the same time strongly shaping and 
structuring the normative frame that embeds contemporary marketization.  
We explore, on this historical and genealogical path, the definitions of 
competition and ethical principles associated with those definitions. We hope 
to underscore in the process the political and ethical message implicitly 
associated with contemporary marketization and many management practices 
that go with it. Beyond the neutrality of „scientific‟ and „best practice‟ 
discourse, an intellectual genealogy of this kind makes it plain that our 
structural choices, economic policy-making and associated educational 
institutions and templates carry with them profound moral implications with a 
probable impact on the socialization of millions of human beings.  
 
 
LIBERALISM AND COMPETITION 
 
We start from the premise that the work and thought of Adam Smith have 
significantly contributed, historically, to economic liberalism. Adam Smith 
was himself building and expanding upon some of the key ideas of the great 
founders of political liberalism – John Locke in particular.  
 
Political Liberalism and the Impact on Adam Smith 
 
For John Locke, a state of nature pre-dates the social contract. In contrast to 
Hobbes, however, Locke‟s picture of the state of nature is not one of 
essentially chaotic and destructive anarchy. The state of nature is not a social 
space – in the sense that it is neither structured by contractual rules nor by a 
sense of community. For Locke, however, this state of nature is stabilized by 
natural law – the right to private property based on the work of the individual. 
In the state of nature, each individual faces nature and interactions between 
individuals have to do with that interface, with work, the product of work and 
property. Pre-political man, „natural‟ man is before anything else a homo 
oeconomicus – in the simple sense here of economic man (Manent, 1986; 
Locke, 1997). The social and political contract comes later and its role is 
merely to create a collective responsibility for the respect of natural law – in 
other words for the protection of private property and economic freedom.  
Adam Smith was strongly inspired by those ideas and was the main bridge, 
historically, between British political liberalism and classical or neoclassical 
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theory (Manent, 1986). More specifically, Smith appropriated three key 
propositions of political liberalism. First, building upon the idea of „natural 
man‟ as economic man, he took over the claim of an independence and 
precedence (both historical and moral) of the economic sphere (Smith, 1999, 
2000). What Locke referred to as the „state of nature‟, Smith called the 
„system of natural liberty‟. The systematic disembeddedness and self-
contained character of economic activity so characteristic of orthodox 
economic thinking in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries directly followed 
upon that. So did the notion that human liberty fundamentally rests upon 
economic freedom (itself implying competition). Second, Adam Smith took 
over the idea that this pre-eminent and autonomous sphere is structured by 
„natural laws‟. Third, Adam Smith also found inspiration in Locke‟s subtle 
reading of the social contract. The social contract and the associated polity 
emerge when the natural order is threatened – but ironically they are 
themselves potentially dangerous to that order. For Smith as for Locke, the 
role of the polity is important but it should remain minimal.  
 
Natural Laws of Economic Exchange 
 
The natural propensity of human beings to barter and trade the products of 
their own work suggests and demands the market. In Smith‟s thought, the 
market is in fact a natural, emergent and essential reality of human and social 
life, stemming from this very propensity. The exchange of goods within that 
natural space reflects three main principles – the division of labour, the 
invisible hand and competition. 
The propensity to exchange has for direct consequence that each individual 
does not have to rely simply on herself to provide for the whole range of her 
needs. She can find the answer to parts of those needs on the market and 
obtain them in exchange for the things she produces herself. The division of 
labour leads to the greater productivity of each individual and hence to the 
maximization of welfare, both for the community and for the individual. The 
extent and complexity of the division of labour depend upon the scale and 
density of the market, and the latter are in direct correlation with demographic 
and infrastructural conditions (Smith, 1999: I, iii). Adam Smith argued that 
the progressive extension and expansion of markets meant, ultimately, not 
only greater individual and collective well-being but also moral, social and 
political progress away from feudalism and tyranny and towards yeomanry 
and democracy (Smith, 1999: I, i, 109; III). 
Another „natural law‟, according to Adam Smith, was that markets were 
orderly. Order did not stem from an all-powerful regulator but from a 
multiplicity of transactions and their combination (Smith, 1999: I, ii, 119). 
The collective good is achieved not by planning it but by leaving free rein to 
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the natural propensity of market players to maximize their individual welfare 
and personal gains. Through combination in the market, the greed and 
selfishness of individual acts turned into a morally satisfying and welfare 
maximizing collective order. In The Wealth of Nations, individuals were 
pictured as essentially a-moral; the market, though, was inherently albeit 
mysteriously producing a progressive and moral order (Nelson, 2001). The 
miracle of the „invisible hand‟ requires, however, specific conditions. 
The invisible hand will not come into play, in particular, lest free rein is 
left to the competitive mechanism. Competition emerges, in the work of Adam 
Smith (although he rarely uses the word) as a third structuring principle of the 
market. In a market where competition works, the scarcity of a particular good 
will naturally lead to the emergence of new providers. This, in turn, will drive 
quantity up and prices down, thus re-establishing a balance between demand 
and offer. In turn, when offer is too plentiful, prices will tend to go down, 
discouraging some of the providers. This balancing mechanism, however, will 
only work if competition is not hampered. Smith pointed to two types of 
obstacles. Market players themselves could introduce disruption and „people 
of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some 
contrivance to raise prices‟ (Smith, 1999: I, x, 232). This part of Smith‟s 
argument has often been neglected but it shows deep consciousness that 
competitive markets were not automatically self-sustaining. Smith also 
strongly denounced tampering and intervention by political authorities 
(Smith, 2000: IV, ii).  
 
No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society 
beyond what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction 
into which it might not otherwise have gone: and it is by no means certain that this 
artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society than that into 
which it would have gone of its own accord. (Smith, 1999: IV, ii, 3) 
 
That particular denunciation is an important part of the genetic link 
between Smith‟s liberalism and contemporary neoliberalism (Skinner, 1999: 
79). 
 
The Ethics of Liberal Competition 
 
Beyond the intuitions and hypotheses of economic liberalism, we can see 
emerging a deeply consequential reading of human nature and of the character 
of social life – and this already in the work and thought of early liberals 
including Adam Smith. Let us try and summarize here this reading, 
underscoring its main ethical implications. 
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Man is by nature an economic man. The economic sphere, the sphere of 
work and property is pre-eminent and all other spheres of human life (social, 
political and so on) come after in the double sense of emerging later 
historically and of having to be subservient to the natural laws of the 
economic sphere. 
In the natural state, man is essentially alone facing nature. His (we have no 
sense of what is happening to „her‟) work is his alone and determines his 
property, which is fundamentally individual. Hence, the notion of 
individualism is profoundly inscribed in the liberal project. At the core of this 
project is what could be called a liberal „Eden‟ – the situation of equilibrium 
with so many free and autonomous individuals qua producers and property 
owners, projected as being the state of nature. In this liberal „Eden‟, 
interactions are chosen, they are free and centre on the bartering and exchange 
of goods produced. The essence of human interaction in this state of nature is, 
in other words, the „spot contract‟. This liberal „Eden‟ is, as in most 
monotheist religions, at the beginning but also may be at the end of history. In 
any case, it is a target, a goal that we should be striving for. In the state of 
nature, the individual is free and independent. Any form of collectivism 
(whether social – family or tribe; political, moral or religious, cultural or 
professional) potentially represents a threat to that fragile equilibrium.  
The liberal market, in its „Eden‟ form, is structured through the division of 
labour, competition and the invisible hand. Here things become slightly more 
complex – and there are two potential readings of early economic liberalism 
and in particular of Adam Smith (Force, 2003: 256ff). If we read only The 
Wealth of Nations, we easily get a sense that the main, if not the only, motor 
of market dynamics and human behaviour are individual self-interest, 
selfishness and greediness. The image used by Adam Smith to suggest that 
has become famous: 
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves 
not to their humanity but to their self-love and never talk to them of our own 
necessities but of their advantage. (Smith, 1999: 119) 
 
A miracle, though, happens through the mysterious alchemy of the market 
and its „invisible hand‟. The aggregation of multiple a- and un-ethical 
individual actions turns into a morally and ethically satisfying collective 
good. In The Wealth of Nations, the market is a moral structure – beyond the 
dimension of efficiency. This idea is still present today in all variants of 
neoclassical economic theory, as „natural law‟ – hence unquestioned and not 
to be scientifically demonstrated (Nelson, 2001). Arguably, this is one of the 
most striking – and consequential – legacies of The Wealth of Nations. If the 
market is indeed a moral and ethical structure, then there is no need to bring 
 12                        Economics and the Question of Moral Foundations 
in ethical considerations at the level of individual behaviours. Furthermore, 
the reasoning could well be that if we attempted to do that, we would only 
distort and disturb the natural regulative mechanisms of the market 
(Friedman, 1962).  
There is, however, a second possible reading of Adam Smith if we focus 
this time on The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In his first book, Smith clearly 
suggests that the market and its invisible hand reveal a rational (that is, 
divine) plan and order. Individuals are linked to each other in and through 
that plan (Nelson, 1991). These individuals are endowed – presumably by the 
„Author of Nature‟ – with certain faculties (such as reason or imagination) 
and particular propensities (Smith, 1982). There are two such propensities – 
self-love that expresses itself in the maximization of self-interest but also 
„fellow feeling‟ as the first sentence of the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
shows: 
 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in 
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing 
it. (Smith, 1982: I.i.1.1) 
 
Fellow feeling implies sympathy and empathy. The individual has a natural 
disposition to form judgements (applied both to herself and others) 
concerning what is fit and proper to be done or to be avoided. But since this 
natural disposition may conflict with self-love, it is probably not enough, 
Smith tells us, as a source of control. It should be strengthened and reinforced 
by the setting up of socially defined „general rules concerning what is fit and 
proper‟ (Smith, 1982: III.4.8). This code of morality – this ethical project – 
may be the missing link in The Wealth of Nations; the one that could explain 
that the aggregation of self-interested actions turns ultimately into a morally 
satisfying collective good. A code of morality that would be deeply inscribed 
in the individuals themselves – although it may sometimes conflict with and 
contradict self-love – could create the basis for collective self-restraint and 
relative harmony. Undeniably, this dimension of Smith‟s work has been all 
but disregarded in classical and neoclassical economics.  
 
READING COMPETITION THROUGH THE PROTESTANT 
ETHIC 
 
The doctrine of divine election and its expression in worldly successes and in 
the realization of one‟s calling does in fact fit rather well with the liberal  idea 
of a self-regulated market. We build here, naturally, upon Max Weber‟s 
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interpretation of the Calvinist religion in its interaction with emergent modern 
and rational capitalism (Weber, 1930).  
 
When Virtue Implies Virtuosity 
 
Jean Calvin was a Franco-Swiss preacher. Together with Martin Luther, he 
was a key actor of the Protestant Reformation movement in Europe during the 
sixteenth century. An important element of Calvinist teachings was the 
doctrine of predestination. The original version of that doctrine was extremely 
rigid. The Calvinist God was a stern and all-powerful master planner who had 
divided humanity from immemorial times between a few that were elect and 
would be saved and the rest who would be damned. The motives of that 
almighty God were beyond human understanding. The division between those 
bound for damnation and those who would be saved was fully predetermined. 
Good deeds, human merits or repentance could have no impact whatsoever. In 
this rigid version, the doctrine of predestination was a source of deep 
existential anguish and pessimistic disillusion. It produced an „unprecedented 
inner loneliness of the single individual‟ (Weber, 1930: 60). Undeniably, it 
was too harsh and inhuman.  
While Calvin himself, as a chosen agent of God, was certain of his own 
salvation, the double practical question of whether one was saved or not and 
what were the signs of salvation, was certainly a burning one for regular 
believers. Hence practical takes on the doctrine of predestination had to 
emerge. More particularly, two types of pastoral advice appeared. First, it was 
an absolute duty to consider oneself one of the chosen – certitudo salutis. 
Second, it was possible to look for signs of salvation in a positive 
contribution to the glorification of God‟s Kingdom on earth and in „intense 
worldly activity‟ (Weber, 1930: 67). This could be done through an absolute 
focus on one‟s „calling‟. The idea of the calling – or Beruf – was that each 
single one of us was put on this planet by the „Great Master Planner‟ into a 
particular position and with a particular duty. Signs of our election could be 
found in the successful accomplishment of our Beruf as it contributed to the 
prosperity of God‟s earthly Kingdom and therefore to the Glory of God. In 
contrast, the refusal to do one‟s calling turned into a sign of damnation. In 
contrast to Catholicism, where the highest form of religious sentiment was 
otherworldly and mystical contemplation, in Calvinism the fulfilment of one‟s 
duty in worldly affairs was the highest form that the moral and religious 
activity of individuals could take (Weber, 1930: 67–70). The distant Calvinist 
God could not be reached otherwise than indirectly through the interface with 
his earthly Kingdom. As a consequence, the Calvinist creed was profoundly 
inner-worldly.  
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Existential anguish was a permanent state – and the search for signs of 
election was and should be permanent. The „God of Calvinism demanded of 
his believers not single good works but a life of good works combined in a 
unified system‟ (Weber, 1930: 71). Virtue – as ultimately symbolized in the 
certituto salutis – implied virtuosity as measured by earthly successes and the 
production of wealth. The wealth that was being created, though, was not for 
enjoyment and it should not be used towards self-aggrandizement. In fact, 
straying away from an ascetic work ethic – through enjoyment, pleasures, 
unnecessary spending, pride, spite or the use of wealth to exert power – could 
be interpreted as signs of damnation. Wealth should be created and 
immediately and forever reinvested to fructify further God‟s Kingdom on 
earth. And the greater the possessions, „the heavier, if the ascetic attitude 
toward life stands the test, the feeling of responsibility for them, for holding 
them undiminished for the glory of God and increasing them by restless 
effort‟ (Weber, 1930: 115). 
 
The Calvinist Ethics of Competition 
 
The notion of competition does not appear in any direct way in the Calvinist 
doctrine, whether in its harsher or softer variants. When we connect, however, 
this doctrine with the development of rational capitalism, we see how the 
competitive mechanism plays an implicit role.  
In its harsher form, the Calvinist doctrine is profoundly and 
consequentially conservative. The doctrine of predestination, in its strong 
reading, implies full determinism. Each single one of us is either saved or 
damned (and implicitly good or bad) by divine decree. Trying to be anything 
else than what we are, trying to change would simply not make any sense. In 
this profoundly stable and rigid world, competition does not make sense. The 
softer variant of Calvinism, however, suggests a very different situation. The 
Calvinist, in this variant „creates his own salvation or as would be more 
correct, the conviction of it‟ (Weber, 1930: 69). The way he does so is by 
working to multiply signs of earthly success – excelling in one‟s calling, 
helping fructify God‟s Kingdom on earth, generating wealth. Moral virtue as 
symbolized by salvation gets translated into worldly virtuosity and in 
particular into economic virtuosity. Man is not by nature oeconomicus but his 
economic activity becomes indirectly the measure of all things, in particular 
of his salvation and of his virtue.  
The Calvinist doctrine of predestination means profound solitude of the 
believer in front of his destiny. The fight for the „conviction of salvation‟ is a 
deeply solitary one; not all can be saved and stakes are high. In fact, I can be 
saved only if others are damned. Hence, competition in gaining the signs of 
salvation, competition in worldly and economic affairs has very profound 
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even vital consequences. I need to succeed, I need to accumulate riches and 
others need to lose as two sides of the same coin – the conviction of my own 
salvation. The Calvinist doctrine suggests essential individualism – the 
solitary fight of each individual to convince himself of his own salvation. The 
consequence has been „the strikingly frequent repetition, especially in the 
English Puritan literature, of warnings against any trust in the aid of 
friendship of men‟ (Weber, 1930: 62). Only God should be your confidant. 
A direct consequence of this essential individualism is its associated 
utilitarianism. All actions and interactions need to serve the broader goal of 
increasing God‟s glory on earth and in parallel my own certitudo salutis. Any 
action that cannot be justified in this way is unnecessary distraction at best, 
sinful enjoyment at worst. Another way to look at this is to underscore the 
need to reinterpret and recast all our actions, interactions and relationships as 
contributing to the generation of wealth – hence reassuring us on the matter of 
our salvation.  
Furthermore, nothing should be allowed to distort the aggregation of 
multiple solitary fights that necessarily impact each other. The Calvinist 
doctrine, in its softer form, builds upon the notion of an immutable, pre-
determined order that will be revealed if those fights are left free play and 
remain unhampered and undistorted. Parallel to the invisible hand in classical 
economic liberalism, here a divine scheme in the background generates a 
profoundly moral order. Salvation is for a minority and salvation is measured 
by earthly success – hence by the capacity to produce wealth. The majority is 
damned and the situation in this world reflects the reality of the other world 
as determined by God. Salvation and wealth are more or less explicitly 
associated with virtue – being „good‟. Naturally, in contrast, being damned 
becomes being bad, sinful, „wicked and ungodly‟ (Westminster, 1717: 
Chapter V – Of Providence). Still, the good need the bad, the saved need the 
damned – one category could not exist without the other. Competition is 
therefore not a fight to the death but a quest for an equilibrium reflecting a 
predetermined order. As such, the softer variant of the Calvinist doctrine was 
also quite conservative. More precisely, it generated good conscience about 
the status quo and a justification for profound social inequalities. The 
unequal distribution of the goods of this world „was a special dispensation of 
Divine Providence, which in these differences, as in particular grace, pursued 
secret ends unknown to men‟ (Weber, 1930: 120). It also prevented and de-
legitimized any kind of social intervention to correct those inequalities – in 
particular on the part of the state – and suggested instead the need for laissez 
faire.  
At the end of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max 
Weber suggested however that modern capitalism was, at the dawn of the 
twentieth century, already in the process of „losing its soul‟, in other words its 
religious and moral backbone. Weber proposed, furthermore, that the 
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Calvinist revolution itself had had the unanticipated consequence of 
weakening through time the religious dimension of our world. By cutting 
away any form of direct connection between God and the believer, by judging 
of salvation through the metrics of economic productivity, Calvinism was 
significantly contributing through time to what Weber called the 
rationalization and „disenchantment of our world‟ (Weber, 1930: 71).  
At the same time, the practical ethics of Calvinism generated their own 
internal contradictions. In time, the latter were coming to weaken the invisible 
spiritual structure of developing capitalism. Calvinism, in its doctrinal form, 
was initially tightly connected to an ethical and religious project that required 
and implied its own material and worldly translation. Such materialization of 
a spiritual project, though, inherently generated tensions. Wealth and the 
materialism associated with its production were seen by Max Weber to have a 
deeply secularizing influence (Weber, 1930: 124). As a consequence, they 
were bound, he argued, to weaken the spiritual structure that originally 
sustained them. This was already in process during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, particularly, he argued, in the United States. Capitalism 
was on its way to „losing its soul‟, becoming „disenchanted‟ and fully 
rationalized and in the end capitalism was turning into an „iron cage‟. 
 
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when 
asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to 
dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the 
modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic 
conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of all 
individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned 
with economic acquisition, with irresistible force... In the field of its highest 
development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious 
and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions. 
(Weber, 1930: 123) 
 
 
 
DARWIN AND SPENCER: SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST 
AND COMPETITION 
 
In his Origins of Species (1859), Darwin outlined one general law that „led to 
the advancement of all organic beings – namely multiply, vary, let the 
strongest live and the weakest die‟. „Selection‟ happened through the 
„struggle for life‟ and advantage was measured by survival and reproductive 
success. Charles Darwin put competition – the „struggle for life‟ – at the 
centre of natural life and of the evolution of species. 
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Rapidly, the evolutionary argument proposed by Charles Darwin was 
adapted and transferred to the social sciences. Although Darwin‟s original 
focus had been the biological evolution of species, he did not himself shy 
away from reading social life through a parallel evolutionary frame. As such, 
he was one of the first „Social Darwinians‟ (Hawkins, 1997; Jones, 1978). 
The key mechanism here again was competition; competition between 
institutions, practices, organizations, ideas. The „fittest‟ survived and the 
„weakest‟ disappeared. This led to an easy association between evolutionary 
social change and social, human, or even moral progress. In fact, Darwin came 
to deduce the superiority of civilized Anglo-Saxon countries over other 
countries from his general law of evolution (Hawkins, 1997). 
 
Bridging Social Darwinism and Liberalism: The Role of Spencer 
 
Herbert Spencer was another key figure of Social Darwinism. Spencer 
contributed significantly both to the theoretical explicitation of Social 
Darwinism and to its diffusion to a broad public across national boundaries. 
An important dimension of Spencer‟s contribution was that he was able to 
create a bridge between Social Darwinism and economics, particularly liberal 
economics. Spencer was also instrumental in the cross-national transfer of 
ideas that brought Social Darwinism to the United States.  
Herbert Spencer was born in Britain in a family that valued individualism 
and self-help. He started his professional life as a railway engineer, later 
becoming a journalist and writer. From 1848 to 1853, Spencer was editor of 
The Economist, the key British financial weekly then already a mouthpiece of 
liberal economic thinking. 
Spencer‟s theory of cosmic evolution pictured a world in constant flux 
where the fight for scarce resources meant significant competitive pressures – 
within species, across species, within nations, across nations. This theory of 
cosmic evolution was associated in Spencer‟s thought with a „theory of 
inevitable progress‟. In his first book, Social Statics, published in 1851, 
Spencer claimed that  
 
Progress, therefore, is not an accident but a necessity... The modifications mankind 
has undergone and is still undergoing result from a law underlying the whole 
organic creation. And provided the human race continues and the constitution of 
things remain the same, those modifications must end in completeness and 
progress. (Spencer, 1851: Chapter II, par. 4) 
 
The tough pressure of competition meant – everywhere – the disappearance 
of the weak and the „survival of the fittest‟. Spencer, in fact, coined this 
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expression that later came to be used as an iconic label of Social Darwinism. 
The harsh discipline of competition had ensured „a constant progress towards 
a higher degree of skill, intelligence and self-regulation, a better coordination 
of actions, a more complete life‟ (Spencer, 1898, vol. II: 526-8). Competition 
should also lead to the elimination of the „unfit‟.  
Such a Panglossian view of evolution and a deterministic sense of 
inescapable progress meant that Spencer believed in uninhibited 
individualism and championed strict laissez-faire. Any kind of interference 
could only be detrimental to the longer term and natural evolutionary process. 
There was no need whatsoever, in the Spencerian world, for politics, 
collective bargaining, welfare or charity initiatives. The latter in fact could be 
highly counterproductive. They were bound to disrupt the natural process that 
should (including in a moral sense for Spencer) lead to the „survival of the 
fittest‟ and to the shouldering aside of the weak.  
In the few years before and after 1870, the Spencerian variant of Social 
Darwinism got transferred from the old to the new continent. The Spencerian 
argument did resonate particularly well with the conditions that characterized 
the United States after the Civil War. Hence, it spread fast and was eagerly 
appropriated. This was a time of upheaval, turbulence, transformations and 
unpredictable developments where the old rules were inadequate and the new 
ones still to be invented (Kolko, 1963). In that context, Spencer‟s ideas 
became the intellectual foundation for the Social Darwinism that came to 
characterize the „Robber Barons‟. The „Robber Barons‟ were that generation 
of businessmen that thrived initially on the chaotic conditions associated with 
the American Civil War and then established firmly their power and 
legitimacy during the period of corporate reinvention of American capitalism, 
at the end of the nineteenth century (Josephson, 1934; Sklar, 1988).  
Spencer‟s ideas also spread within American intellectual circles, with 
significant impact in particular in American universities. Altogether, the 
Social Darwinian world-view, particularly in its Spencerian form, became an 
important ingredient of American social science with a profound and long -
term impact (Hawkins, 1997). It was read, interpreted, used and appropriated 
– and transformed in the process. There were different paths to such 
transformation. We will just point to an interesting effort at reconciling and 
bringing together Spencerian evolutionism and the Calvinist doctrine. 
William Graham Sumner played here an interesting role. Sumner reinterpreted 
the „survival of the fittest‟ as the consequence of a divine scheme and turned, 
in the process, laissez-faire into a natural/divine law.  
 
The law of the survival of the fittest was not made by man and cannot be abrogated 
by man. We can only, by interfering with it, produce the survival of the unfittest. 
(Sumner, 1963: 17) 
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Sumner also re-affirmed the Calvinist ethic as, interestingly, an instrument 
of the progressive evolutionary process championed by Spencer 
  
Labour and self-denial, to work yet abstain from enjoying, to earn a product yet 
work on as if one possessed nothing, have been the condition of advance for the 
human race from the beginning and they continue to be such still. (Sumner, 1963: 
40) 
 
When Herbert Spencer went to the United States in 1882, he was received 
with the highest honours. Andrew Carnegie or John D. Rockefeller revered 
him (Chernow, 1998). Spencerian evolutionism could, in and of itself, justify 
– including in a moral sense – the brutal tactics that were then characteristic 
of American capitalism. Violent and rapacious behaviour, in the context of 
„free‟, in the sense of wild competition, were identified as necessary means 
leading to progress through struggle. The „elimination‟ of the weak and the 
institutionalization of a hierarchical and unequal division of labour were also 
given legitimacy in this way. According to Spencer 
 
Not only does this struggle for existence involve the necessity that personal ends 
must be pursued with little regard to the evils entailed on unsuccessful competitors 
but it also involves the necessity that there shall not be too keen a sympathy with 
that diffuse suffering inevitable accompanying this industrial battle. (Spencer, 1890: 
611). 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Robber Barons rapidly seized upon an ideology that 
turned in this way struggle, violence and brutal use of power into necessary 
steps towards progress.  
 
 
 
The Ethics of Spencerian Competition 
 
In his work, Herbert Spencer suggests in fact an evolution of the main 
mechanisms of evolution. At an early stage of development of humanity, he 
tells us, warfare and diseases were the main operative mechanisms in the 
process of selection (Spencer, 1878: 193). Progressively, though, and as the 
human species evolved, warfare diminished in significance. As hygiene and 
medical science made progress, diseases and physical weaknesses had less of 
an impact. Warfare and diseases did not disappear as mechanisms, naturally, 
but they were complemented and in part replaced by what Spencer calls 
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„industrial war‟: „After this stage has been reached, the purifying process … 
remains to be carried on by industrial war and by a competition of societies‟ 
(Spencer, 1878: 199). 
Hence, for Spencer, man is not by nature a homo oeconomicus but a 
warrior, a fighter. This warrior and fighting spirit originally reflected and 
expressed a natural law – the law of progressive evolution – through the 
struggle for life. In time, this spirit was translated into a different kind of 
mechanism – that of unhampered economic competition. So the profound 
nature of man remained the same – a warrior fighting for his own survival. But 
the way this nature expressed itself evolved through time – from warfare to 
the market. At a later stage of development, man did become a homo 
oeconomicus in the sense that the key dimension of his nature (his fighting 
spirit) played out mostly through market competition. 
Reading Herbert Spencer, we realize that the picture of the market that 
emerges is one of a ruthless battlefield. Competition should be not only „free‟ 
but in fact „wild‟. The idea that it is a jungle out there and that everything, as 
a consequence, is and should be possible is very much what comes to mind – 
strong in the morning, dead in the evening! Competition is all out war. 
Competition is not merely a struggle against nature. Nor is it enough to think 
of it as a search for equilibrium where all are needed and find their place. 
Competition here is a war of all against all – there should be clear winners 
and clear losers. More often than not, losing means dying in the real sense of 
the term (for a firm, for a society, even for an individual directly or by lack of 
posterity).  
The violence and the suffering necessarily associated with such an 
understanding of competition are justified in teleological terms as bringing 
along human and social progress, a better and more developed society. Where 
individual units might suffer or disappear, the collective will benefit through 
reaching a „higher stage‟. In Spencer‟s reading of it, the freely playing 
competitive mechanism is progressive and therefore morally good. The 
argument should even be pushed one step further. Not only is the competitive 
mechanism morally justified and morally good but so are also all its 
consequences. Individual suffering becomes morally legitimate since it is a 
means, a step towards collective progress.  
Mitigating that suffering, furthermore, through charity, state intervention 
or any form of social engineering distorts the natural process and mechanism 
of selection. Hence, all form of intervention is an obstacle to collective human 
progress – and as such at the same time both highly counter-productive and 
morally illegitimate. Absolute laissez-faire, whatever its consequences, 
should be the rule when it comes to market competition. The game is fully 
and essentially an individualist one and it should remain so – one individual 
against others; one firm against others; one nation against others. 
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Interestingly, by pushing a step too far the quest for „pure‟ market 
competition, Spencer opens up a dangerous breach. Wild competition, 
without bounds, is in fact logically bound to lead, progressively, to a 
reduction of competition! If everything is possible in the context of economic 
warfare, then the strong will kill and eat the weak, the strong will get stronger, 
the number of actors will altogether be reduced and the conditions for 
competition radically altered. In parallel, the constant struggle of all against 
all, the possibility to be at the top one day and dead the other create a 
profoundly distressing situation. History repeatedly shows that individuals or 
individual units will try as much as they can to mitigate and set bounds to 
such disturbing pressure. Adam Smith had pointed to the natural propensity 
of „people of the same trade‟ to convene and agree on ways to dampen 
competitive pressures (Smith, 1999: I, x, 232). While Spencer‟s ideas were 
crossing the Atlantic, the temptation was strong in the US but also in Europe 
for industrialists to counter competition through different forms of 
collaboration. The last decades of the twentieth century saw a multiplication 
of cartels, trusts or other forms of association in the United States – the 
objective of which was to make competition less wild if not to get rid of it 
altogether. Too much competition, in short, generates an urge to control and 
reduce it. This urge stems not only from external actors (like the state) but is 
also to be found amongst the actors in competition themselves. In the end, and 
if there is no regulatory intervention, the logical evolution is from wild 
competition to a progressive taming of competitive pressures, in particular 
through increasing unit size and the decreasing number of actors involved. 
Wild competition suggests in time an oligopolization (of industries but also 
potentially of societies, nations or other forms of collectives). 
 
TOWARD A NEOLIBERAL SYNTHESIS 
 
Those three bodies of ideas – economic liberalism, Calvinist doctrine and 
Spencerian evolutionism – met, combined and influenced each other on 
American soil. The encounter was intense and powerful. There were, as Max 
Weber would have said, powerful „elective affinities‟ between those three 
bodies of thought. We turn now to what appears, in retrospect, a step towards 
synthesis. Neoliberalism has multiple roots and reflects intermingled 
influences. We focus here on the Chicago School as one of the key roots and 
pillars of the neoliberal doctrine as we know it today. The Chicago School 
was born and developed in the economics department of the University of 
Chicago. It built upon but also overcame and went beyond classical economic 
liberalism, the Calvinist heritage and Spencerian insights. It also emerged and 
developed in a peculiar period, in times when American capitalism was 
undergoing major transformations. This period saw the emergence of 
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oligopolistic equilibria in many industries, the multiplication of large firms 
and the spread of collective ownership of the corporate type (Sklar, 1988; 
Djelic, 1998).  
 
Building the Liberal Temple: The Early Years at Chicago 
 
Created in 1892, the University of Chicago was originally financed by John 
D. Rockefeller. The „Titan‟ of the American oil industry was threading a path 
followed by many other „Robber Barons‟ (Josephson, 1932; Chernow, 1998). 
After accumulating wealth on an unprecedented scale, including through 
questionable methods, the „Great Captains‟ of American industry were buying 
social and moral legitimacy by fuelling back some of that wealth into 
philanthropic activities. In its early years, the University of Chicago was 
nicknamed the „Standard Oil University‟. The first head of the economics 
department was J. Lawrence Laughlin, one of the most conservative 
economists in the country. Laughlin was a combination of neoclassical 
theorist and aggressive big business apologist – the type that seemed to 
„confirm the suspicion of those who regarded the University of Chicago as a 
tool of business interests‟ (Coats, 1963).  
The liberalism championed by Laughlin differed in important ways from 
Smithian-type liberalism. His apology of the market was reconciled with the 
corporate revolution that transformed American capitalism (Sklar, 1988). 
Laughlin defended the status quo on the grounds that eternal laws of 
economics were just and progressive. At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
status quo meant oligopolies in most industries (Bornemann, 1940). This 
reconciliation between markets and „bigness‟ has remained to this day a 
trademark of the so-called Chicago School of economics (Miller, 1962; 
Nelson, 2001). The Chicago School has been characterized by its 
„willingness, even eagerness, to accept whatever results the free market grinds 
out‟ (Bronfenbrenner, 1962: 73) and by its incessant struggle against any 
form of state intervention. 
The Chicago School crystallized during the 1930s around the key figure of 
Franck Knight (Nelson, 2001). The group that emerged then would make the 
Chicago School famous – Jacob Viner, Henry Simons, Aaron Director, Allen 
Wallis, Milton Friedman, Rose Director Friedman and George Stigler (Reder, 
1982). Franck Knight championed free markets on moral grounds, as the best 
arrangements to ensure the preservation of individual freedom. Increased 
efficiency and utility maximization were positive collaterals, not ends in 
themselves. (Nelson, 2001) 
 
Chicago – The Post-World War II Generations 
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The Chicago School of Economics reached maturity in the 1950s. The new 
generation had appropriated the philosophical insights of their teachers, in 
particular Frank Knight. There were two features, however, that set that 
generation apart. First, it jumped on the bandwagon of the „marginal‟ or 
mathematical revolution in economics (Schumpeter, 1983: III, ch. v). It 
contributed, in fact, to the acceleration of the move to quantitative methods 
and complex econometrics within the economics profession (Reder, 1982). 
Second, with Milton Friedman as its main spokesman, this generation re-
affirmed the public and polemical role of the economist, originally explored 
by Laughlin but neglected by the generation of the 1930s.  
By the early 1960s, the Chicago School in economics had acquired its 
unique features. First, one finds an unconditional commitment to and 
advocacy of the market mechanism. The Chicago economist „differs in this 
advocacy from many economists on his dogmatism and in assuming that the 
actual market functions like the ideal one‟ (Miller, 1962: 66). Second, one 
finds a principled rejection of regulation and state intervention that implies 
acceptation of the evolutionary dynamics of market competition and of their 
consequences. This has meant, in particular, that the Chicago School has 
accepted „bigness‟. The fear of concentrated wealth, present in the work of 
Adam Smith, has had little weight here, much less in any case than the fear of 
government. Gary Becker summed it up well: „It may be preferable not to 
regulate economic monopolies and to suffer their bad effects, rather than to 
regulate them and suffer the effects of political imperfection‟ (Becker, 1958: 
109).  
Third, one finds a Panglossian vision of the world. The market mechanism 
is seen as progressive – leading to greater efficiency, collective prosperity but 
also individual freedom (Friedman and Friedman, 1979, xv, 28: 129). Fourth, 
provided the state does not meddle, the market mechanism should be self-
sustaining. For the Chicago Boys, faith in the market is such that monopoly is 
at most an ephemeral situation that should not threaten the vision of 
competitive markets (Reder, 1982). Fifth, the associated conception of human 
nature is that of neoclassical economics – human beings are out to maximize 
utility. The Chicago School has systematically explored that path by 
expanding the boundaries of economics, explaining theft, discrimination, 
marriage, fertility, child-rearing (Becker, 1971, 1991), legal issues (Posner, 
1972) or the functioning of the church and religious institutions (Ekelund et 
al., 1996) through the prism of utility maximization.  
Sixth, and finally, an important feature of the contemporary Chicago 
School has been its capacity to reconcile science and politics (Weber, 1959). 
The post-war generation contributed to the scientific and mathematical turn of 
economics. At the same time, though, this generation also became highly 
involved in policy-making and ultimately in political discussions. The move 
to politics and policy-making was, at least at the start, partly accidental 
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(Djelic, 2006). Soon, though, the most vocal amongst Chicago economists – 
in particular Milton Friedman – finding out that there was a „market‟ for their 
ideas, engaged in normative proselytizing. A few of the Chicago economists 
turned themselves into missionaries of market mechanisms within but also 
beyond the economic realm. All their proposals for reform 
… involved either increased use of the price system (e.g. on national markets but
also across national boundaries), substitution of private for public production (e.g. 
in health, education), replacement of legal compulsion by voluntary – financially 
induced – private cooperation or a mixture of all three. (Reder, 1982: 25) 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In retrospect, the spread, in the United States, of Social Darwinism in its 
Spencerian form proved to be an important factor contributing to and 
hastening the secularization of capitalism in that country. The idea of an 
emergent natural order was a common feature of economic liberalism in its 
Smithian variant, of Calvinism and of Social Darwinism in the Spencerian 
version. In all three bodies of thought, that natural order was considered to be 
beyond human intervention. In fact, in all three cases, that order could only be 
revealed if natural laws were left free play. Natural laws had a divine 
dimension both in Calvinism and in a complete reading of Adam Smith. In the 
version of economic liberalism that forgot the Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
though, as well as in Spencerian Social Darwinism, natural laws were 
essentially mechanistic. They had no „deeper meaning‟, no ethical foundation 
– they just were there to be reckoned with.
Like Calvinism, economic liberalism and Spencerian Social Darwinism 
were highly conservative ideologies but they were so in a different sense. 
Calvinism justified the status quo and the position that all occupied in the 
divine scheme of things was reflected in the social hierarchies of this world. 
There was, however, room for all in this world – the weak and the strong, 
those who would be damned and those who would be saved. Economic 
liberalism in its mechanistic variant and Spencerian Social Darwinism 
justified instead the logics of evolutionary dynamics – and the survival of 
only the fittest and most competitive, which implied as correlate the 
disappearance, death or disintegration of the weak and the least competitive. 
Those logics were not (and should not be) mitigated by any form of self-
restraint or „fellow feeling‟ – as had been the case both in a full reading of 
Smithian liberalism or in Calvinist capitalism. Instead, the fight of all against 
all should be given absolutely free play even if it expressed itself in the most 
violent and brutal manner. In that context, a moral frame was reinterpreted as 
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mere obstacle – just like laws, regulation and state intervention – to the free 
play of natural, mechanistic, forces. A moral frame and „fellow feeling‟ did 
not belong with economic logics and were in fact bound to disturb those 
logics.  
In the twentieth century, the emergence of neoliberalism represented an 
emerging synthesis. All three bodies of thought – economic liberalism, 
Calvinist doctrine and Spencerian evolutionism – were present and combined 
in this synthesis. At the same time, the neoliberal synthesis pushed forward a 
process already well under way – the disenchantment of economics and 
economic activity. Rationalization, individualism, utilitarianism, laissez-faire 
and a belief in progress remained as key building blocks. Neoliberalism also 
appropriated the reconciliation between competition and size that was 
mentioned above. The profound meaning, though, the legitimacy and the 
moral backbone that had been understood to sustain economic activity, at 
least in classical economy and in the Calvinist world-view, had all but 
disappeared. Strangely enough, notions like „invisible hand‟ or „spontaneous 
market equilibrium‟ carried with them the shadows and echoes of a lost moral 
frame. This lost moral frame had originally given meaning to a peculiar form 
of economic and acquisitive behaviour. It also had placed bounds and limits 
upon it, through notions like „fellow feeling‟ as a counterpoint to „self-
interest‟. Without the frame, only pragmatic ethics remained – acute 
individualism combined with utilitarianism; materialism as the only end; an 
attachment to laissez-faire and competition even when those were leading in 
fact through their own internal contradictions to a weakening of competition; 
rationalization and the eviction of pockets of irrationality; finally a profound 
conviction that the evolutionary trend meant „progress‟ whatever the 
associated externalities.  
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